

# NATO'S SECURITIZATION PROCESS AS IDENTITY FORMATION AND CULTURAL SYSTEM

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**Abstract:** This paper gazes at the recent US Army and NATO operation 'Dragoon Ride' (20 March - 1 April 2015) which was performed in response to Russia's actions in Ukraine (March 2014). It argues that the aim of this military exercise, which has been fabricated and staged as a security ritual, is to interpellate the NATO citizen. However, this security ritual is to be understood inside the transformational process which NATO has initiated after the implosion of the Soviet Union in order to survive in the new global insecurity environment as a power-knowledge-security structure. At the end the paper shows that NATO while it is developing a 'comprehensive' securitization discourse in which the existential threat is not only a non-military threat, at the end it plays the same Cold War emotional card of a Russian military attack to NATO's nations.

**Keywords:** NATO, interpellation, security, securitization, ritual.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), since the implosion of the former Soviet Union (1991) and the disappearance of its supposed mortal enemy, on whom it constructed its own military, geopolitical

and warring space, has been re-fabricating its own identity and functions. And has struggled to retain its status quo ante power position inside a changing global security environment in taking an active part in various conflicts (security operations) around the world. In this transformative exercise the Alliance has modified its security language and narrative employing a Critical Security Studies language, and in this process has adapted its language, its security dilemma, and its securitization process to its own subjective reading of the 'out there security/insecurity reality' in order to reproduce itself as a human structure.

In this workout the Alliance operates as a power-knowledge-security-total institution structure which is interested to produce and sell to its own NATO audience an insecurity-security self-referential narrative which permits to make itself indispensable for the maintenance of security in NATO's territories. This means that as a power-knowledge-security-total institution structure (1) it has legitimate power to get X to do something that X would not otherwise do, and has power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they

accept their role in the existing order of things (Lukes 2005: 11; as it will be developed in this paper this idea of power overlaps with the concepts of bourgeois ideology of Barthes, of ideology of Zizek, of the distribution of the sensible of Ranciere, and the idea of identity formation and cultural system); (2) it produces through the use of a technocratic apparatus (Galimberti 2011) a security-insecurity knowledge, and defines and certifies as reliable knowledge<sup>i</sup> what insecurity is (the existential threat), and the protocol which must be adopted for the security operation; (3) it has recognized legitimate power and the monopoly of the use of force, therefore it can take and carry security actions (war, crisis management operations, etc); and (4) as a total institution (Goffman 2010) it administers the life of the people who lives in its structure, and impose an 'habitus' (Bourdieu 2005) to its members, and the same members identify themselves with the same structure. Meaning that their identity is shaped by the very total institution, like the case of this paper in which NATO moulds, influences and affects the construction and the perpetuation of NATO-ness. As a result the NATO-citizen translate the 'out there security/insecurity reality' as NATO does therefore confirm the point that NATO is again a cultural system (Geertz 1973).

The above introduction opens ontological and epistemological questions regarding what insecurity and security is. This is because NATO, along its narrating activity, do not provide a straight and objective definition of what security is, and we have to assume that security means 'NATO', or living under or with NATO protection, whilst for insecurity the Alliance narrative moves from the extreme of an 'armed attack against one or more of them (the parties) in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against

them all' (Art. 5, The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C. 4<sup>th</sup> April 1949) to 'the risk of...' which appears on the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept.

However, there is a specific important aspect which passes through the image of an armed attack and 'the risk of...', and it is represented by the constant element of 'anxiety' which (1) is present in the etymological meaning of 'security' too; and (2) do play a pivotal point around which turns this paper that want to demonstrate that security is a myth which sustains a cultural system in which the spectacle of the myth (US Army and NATO operation 'Dragoon Ride') has an important function.

## II. SECURITY AS A MYTH

Analysing the evolution of the NATO's New Strategic Concepts (1999 and 2010) from the implosion of the former Soviet Union up to the recent 2010 text, what emerges is that the Alliance has been reformulating its security dilemma in order to prevent a security paradox, meaning that the security response to an insecurity event is not adequate at all.

A security dilemma refers to a situation wherein two or more states are drawn into conflict, possibly even war, over security concerns, even though none of the states actually desire conflict. Essentially, the security dilemma occurs when two or more states each feel insecure in relation to other states. For Booth and Wheeler the security dilemma is a complex relationship of both psychological and material dimensions, and 'is a two-level predicament in relations between states and other actors, with each level consisting of two related lemmas (or propositions that can be assumed to be valid) which force decision makers to choose between

them. The first and basic level consists of a dilemma of interpretation about the motives, intentions and capabilities of the others; the second and derivative level consists of a dilemma of response about the most rational way of responding. First level: a dilemma of interpretation is the predicament facing decision-makers when they are confronted, on matters affecting security, with a choice between two significant and usually (but not always) undesirable alternatives about the military policies and political postures of other entities. This dilemma of interpretation is the result of the perceived need to make a decision in the existential condition of unresolvable uncertainty about the motives, intentions and capabilities of the others. Those responsible have to decide whether perceived military developments are for defensive or self-protection purposes only (to enhance security in an uncertain world) or whether they are for offensive purposes (to seek to change the status quo to their advantage). Second level: a dilemma of response logically begins when the dilemma of interpretation has been settled. Decision-makers then need to determine how to react. Should they signal, by words and deeds, that they will react in kind, for deterrent purposes? Or should they seek to signal reassurance? If the dilemma of response is based on misplaced suspicion regarding the motives and intentions of others actors, and decision-makers react in a militarily confrontational manner, then they risk creating a significant level of mutual hostility when none was originally intended by either party; if the response is based on misplaced trust, there is a risk they will be exposed to coercion by those with hostile intentions. When leaders resolve their dilemma of response in a manner that creates a spiral of mutual hostility, when neither wanted it, a situation has

developed which we call the security paradox' (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 4-5).

Therefore, what do play an important role in the definition of what security is (because this is the function of the security dilemma) depends on psychological and material dimensions, on interpretation, and on power. Thus, the subjective approach to security is confirmed.

In addition, the Alliance has not yet defined the meaning of security but has always presented its own meanings of security (the NATO's strategic concepts) and has produced its own system of communication. And this contrast with the fact that the very referent of the term 'security' (freedom from danger, fear, anxiety, destitution, and so on), is represented only by its etymological meaning which bears strong emotions. 'Security' is derived from the Latin '*securitas*' and in its turn from '*sine*' (= without) + '*cura*' (= anxiety, worry). Therefore, the above reasoning demonstrates that the relation between a power-knowledge structure like NATO, a term (security), its meaning and its usage is the same relation which exists in the concept of myth developed by Roland Barthes (2000) for whom the myth is a system of communication defined as a 'second order semiological system'.




Fig. 1 Source: Barthes, R. (2000), *Mythologies*, London: Vintage Books, 115.

For Barthes, the 'first order semiological system' is formed by the '1.Signifier' (acoustic image), '2.Signified' (concept) and '3.Sign' (relation between concept and image). This first order represents a linguistic system in which, once applied to the term 'security', it produces that: (1) '1.Signifier' is the written word 'security'; '2.Signified' is represented by the etymological meaning of security: '*securitas*' (without anxiety); (3) '3. Sign' is what I call 'security-*securitas*', which represent the 'referent' in this paper.

However, the myth is a peculiar system because it is a constructed from a semiological chain which existed before it: it is a second order semiological system. That which is a sign (the associative total of a concept and an image) in the first system, becomes a mere signifier in the second. The material of mythical speech, however different at the start, are reduced to a pure signifying function as soon as they are caught by myth. Whatever it deals only with alphabetical or pictorial writing, myth wants to see in them only a sum of signs, a global sign, the final term of a first semiological chain. And it is precisely this final term which will become the first term of a greater system This lateral shift is essential for the analysis of myth. In myth there are two semiological systems, one of which is staggered in relation to the other: a linguistic system, the language, which Barthes calls language-object, because it is the language which myth gets hold of in order to build its own system; and myth itself, which Barthes calls 'metalanguage', because it is a second language in which one speaks about the first. When he reflects on a metalanguage, the semiologist no longer needs to ask himself questions about the composition of the language-object, he no longer has to take into account the details of the linguistic schema; he will only need to know its total term, or global sign, and

only as this term lends itself to myth. This is why the semiologist is entitled to treat in the same way writing and pictures: what he retains from them is the fact that they are both signs and they constitute a language-object.

Therefore the 'second order semiological system' of the myth of security is made up of: 'I SIGNIFIER' is provided by '3.Sign' (security-*securitas*); 'II SIGNIFIED' is the result of the political, intellectual, elaboration of 'security-*securitas*' by an epistemological community (in the case of his paper this is represented by the Alliance technocratic apparatus), which transforms and recreates the meaning and practices of what constitute anxiety-existential threat; 'III SIGN' is the characteristic and peculiar image/picture that the sign will assume which changes in time and space.

As a result, while in the linguistic system the word 'security' has only one referent represented by its etymological meaning '*securitas*', in the metalanguage system the term 'security' is the result of a linguistic-narrative fabrication, operated by a power-knowledge structure, and therefore change with time and space.

In this specific context the step from the first to the second semiological order, then the very fabrication of the myth security, is possible through a technique defined as securitization process which allow the power-knowledge-security-total institution structure (1) to define a human even as an existential threat to the survival of the community it protects; (2) to add the element of 'emergency' which blocks any external (of the structure) tentative to criticize the move; and (3) to present the myth security as 'reliable knowledge', therefore, 'legitimate security knowledge'<sup>ii</sup> when in reality is only an 'image of knowledge'<sup>iii</sup>.

For Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde security 'is the move that takes politics beyond the conventional rules of

the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying action outside the normal bounds of political procedure)' (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998: 23-24). In this way, the process of securitization is more than a speech act (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998: 24-26; Balzacq 2011) through which an issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures, and justifying actions outside the bounds of the political procedure (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998: 23-24). It is rather 'an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thought, and intuitions) about the critical vulnerability of a referent object that concurs with the securitizing actor's reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent object with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development' (Balzacq 2011: 3).

However, once the security myth is created by the security actor (NATO) it needs a ritual, a spectacle in order 'to prompt an audience to build a coherent

network of implications (feelings, sensations, thought, and intuitions)'. And paraphrasing Huysmans (2006) who see in the process of securitization a technique of governing danger, I see in the 'articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.)' are condensed in the ritual-spectacle of the myth security, a technique of governing the myth. And this technique of governing the myth has to be understood inside the framework provided by the concept of the sacralization of politics, which, according to Gentile (2007), consists of bestowing a sacred character to a secular entity, as the nation, the state, the race, the political party and the leader. In these situations, politics become a religion because, through a complex of beliefs, expressed by the use of myths, rituals, and symbols, it pretends to define the meaning and the final end of the individual and the collective existence (Gentile 2007: vii).

### III. THE SPECTACLE OF THE MYTH NATO-SECURITY: THE 'DRAGOON RIDE' OPERATION

'I am at the barber's, and a copy of Paris-Match is offered to me. On the cover, a young Negro in a French uniform is saluting, with his eyes uplifted, probably fixed on a fold of the tricolour. All this is the meaning of the picture. But, whether naively or not, I see very well what it signifies to me: that France is a great Empire, that all her sons without any colour discrimination, faithfully serve under her flag, and that there is no better answer to the detractors of an alleged colonialism than the zeal shown by this Negro in serving his so-called oppressors. I am therefore again faced with a great semiological system: there is a

signifier, itself already formed with a previous system (a black soldier is giving the French salute); there is a signified (it is here a purposeful mixture of Frenchness and militariness); finally, there is a presence of the signified through the signifier' (Barthes 2000: 116).

What emerges, however, from the above quotation is that an individual, like Roland Barthes, enters into contact with a myth when a copy of Paris-Match is offered to him, and, therefore, not during the performance of a rite. Yet, the rite is present in a different form in the very moment the picture of the cover was taken. Thus, the individual with a copy of Paris-Match in his hands becomes (if French) a 'reader' who consumes and lives the myth (and the rite) as a story (and on it he creates his impression on reality) through the cover of a French magazine.



The same Barthes's approach can be used to analyse and interpret the recent pictures and articles that have followed and covered the 'Dragoon Ride' operation which here is considered as a ritual of NATO's security. This is because the Alliance's ritual shows many peculiarities of the myths analysed by Barthes. The Operation 'Dragoon Ride'<sup>iv</sup> was a 2015 military exercise of the US army and NATO involving transfer of military technique and personnel from the Baltic states across Poland and the Czech Republic to Germany, following the Operation Atlantic Resolve. From 20 March to 1 April 2015, a convoy of armored fighting vehicles (amongst them Strykers) returned via road to their garrison Vilseck, after manoeuvres in Poland, Estonia and Lithuania. The road march was intended to demonstrate solidarity and support for Central and Eastern European NATO allies in response to Russia's actions in Ukraine, beginning in March 2014. The convoy consisted of more than 500 American troops of the 3rd Squadron of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (nicknamed 'Dragoons').

Like the cover of Paris Match, the pictures displayed here, and which were published and broadcaster worldwide, transmit the same sensation that NATO is a benevolent Empire which care of its citizen. Here, we see soldiers saluting, and marching with flags among citizens of former Warsaw Pact Countries. The soldiers are wearing Cavalry Regiment hats which remind to the European reader Joseph H. Lewis and John Ford's western Hollywood movies in which the 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment trumpet was accompanying the cavalry charge in the moment the regiment came to save the people from the hated and bloody enemy.



Moreover, looking at these pictures we can identify the sign which embodies the myth of security. In all these images the sign of NATO-ness (military, macho, benevolent, smiling, paternalistic, armed with weapons) shines through, and like the signs identifies by Barthes in his 'Mythologies' (2000), the sign of NATO-ness plays a role in the bourgeois myth. This sign is the carrier of a specific meaning which is



attached to a myth, and that is translated and understood inside a defined cultural and social context. And like the case of the 'fringe' which is wear by all the characters in Mankiewicz's movie 'Julius Cesar' (Barthes 2000: 26-28), the sign of NATO (1) is an aesthetic elements, (2) indicates 'a specific mixture of self-righteousness, virtue and conquest'; and (3) it aims at making people understand.

However, 'the intermediate sign, the fringe of Roman-ness or the sweating of thought, reveals a degraded spectacle, which is equally afraid of simple reality and of total artifice. For although it is a good thing if a spectacle is created to make the world more explicit, it is both reprehensible and deceitful to confuse the sign with what is signified. And it is a duplicity which is peculiar to bourgeois art: between the intellectual and the visceral sign is hypocritically inserted a hybrid, at once elliptical and pretentious, which is pompously christened "nature"' (Barthes 2000: 28).

To sum up, when we look at these pictures as NATO-citizens, like in the case of Barthes who receives copy of Paris-Match, we recognize the authoritativeness of NATO's message which is broadcast worldwide; and we understand the language-discourse-narrative of NATO and the picture on the cover which refers to ritualization of the myth (the young black in a French uniform who is saluting the French national flag during a rite-ceremony-performance in Barthes case, and the US soldiers parading and saluting in this specific case). Therefore, the above actions describe a hermeneutic circle of interpretation, which has its own time-spatial dimension which matches with the anthropological place-interpretative space that corresponds to the space (and time) of the myth 'Security is NATO security'.

Therefore, what emerges from the above illustration is that there is a strong connection, a relationship between myth, rite and new form of ritualization, one-dimensional thought and behaviour, identity, ideology, mass media, mass communication, and context which applies to the myth of 'Security is NATO security' like the case of 'France is a great empire'.

Moreover, this security ritual can be seen as an artistic work of bricolage, and an installation of art which, when performed like the case of the 'Dragoon Ride' 10 days, 6 countries, 1,100 miles parade, creates two opposite forces: centripetal and centrifugal. The centripetal force is evident, when the rite, for its character of urgency, emergency, and existential threat represented by the insecurity event, participates in the reinforcement and in the recreation of the identity and status of the security actor. As in the case of the 'Dragoon Ride' operation, NATO performs its security rites-spectacles in its territory where: (1) it fabricates a one-dimensional (Marcuse 1991: 14) NATO-ness; (2) creates its own language; (3) depicts the plot under a particular light; and (4) defines the threat, in manipulating anxiety, in capturing and constructing and convincing its public. And at the end of this NATO-ness bricolaging process, NATO poses itself as the only security actor-hero in which the audience will identify for its salvation (Ercolani 2011: 69).

On the other hand, the centrifugal force can be seen as generated by that spark (Canetti 1972) and/or social (and religious) electricity that make an audience be called to play not a game but an active emotional/interpretative role because this situation is inherently dramatic. Furthermore, the participants 'not only do things, they show themselves and others

what they are doing or have done: actions take on a reflexive and performed-for-an-audience aspect' (Schechner 2003: 186); they also crystallize as mass, leaving aside what is a formless and shapeless quality (Canetti 1972).

Therefore, the centrifugal force of the rite spreads an emotional contagion which produces that collective 'effervescence' by which 'within a crowd moved by a common passion, we become susceptible to feelings and actions of which we are incapable on our own' (Durkheim 2001: 157). This transmits an alarm signal which participates in the construction of imagined communities (Anderson 2006) through its language. It recruits subjects among the individuals, or transforms individuals into subjects through an operation called 'interpellation', which refers to the process by which people, when 'hailed' by discourse, recognize themselves in that hailing (Althusser 1988: 55). For Fierke (2007: 86), 'interpellation assumes that different representations of the world incorporate patterns of identity and ways of functioning in the world, which are located within different power relations and which make different interests possible. Concrete individuals come to identify with these subject positions and the representations in which they appear. As subjects identify with them, the power relations and interests entailed in discourse are naturalized and these representations seem to reflect the world as it really is'. This in turn establishes the security actor's language which sets the rules of the security 'game' and the one-dimensionality of NATO-ness.

Then, it is through this process, that the significant (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998: 27), empowering (Balzaq 2011: 8-11) and playing audience is

transformed into a liturgical mass (Gentile 2007: 73). And this is possible because the Mass ritual, unlike in a theatrical representation, is efficient, and no matter how much the service has very important aesthetic dimensions, what is important is the passionate affirmation. The Mass ritual is a closed circle which includes only the congregation and those officiating, and there is no room for mere appreciators. As an obligatory action, its members enter into it, and signal to each other and to the hierarchy (Schechner 2003: 137). This might be compared also at the extreme to the Orwellian 'Two Minutes Hate' where 'a hideous ecstasy of fear and vindictiveness, a desire to kill, to torture, to smash faces in with a sledge-hammer (seems) to flow through the whole group of people like an electric current, turning one even against one's will into a grimacing, screaming lunatic. And yet the rage that one felt was an abstract, undirected emotion which could be switched from one object to another like the flame of a blowlamp' (Orwell 2000: 16). Therefore, the Mass ritual, has completely embodied the security actor's language, and reacts as a model reader who fully cooperates with a text (Eco 2006) because it fully recognises itself in the Alliance's language and in the cultural idiosyncrasy and individual idiosyncrasy of the myth security, and then in the ritual (Ercolani 2011: 72-73)

In conclusion, the rite-spectacle, with its own centrifugal force wants to capture an audience, to produce liturgical mass, and to discipline and fabricate docile bodies 'that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved' (Foucault 1991: 136). And, thanks to its 'mimesis didactic aspects' (Cobley 2006: 81), the rite becomes a set of statements and practices through which certain language becomes institutionalized and normalized over time' (Neumann: 2009: 61). That rite

produces a cultural artefact: 'a cultural practice traceable to a particular historical context concerned with shaping the politics of security' (Williams 2007: 4). In foucauldian terms, the security ritual-spectacle has the power to assemble, produce, and fabricate knowledge (Foucault 1980: 59), this is because the power-knowledge-security-total institution structure, which produce the myth and its ritual, occupies a central panoptical position from which it gazes and controls through its own paradigm the territory, space and use of its security myth-ideology-concept (Foucault 1991: 195-228). Therefore, the myth of security and insecurity are accepted as real knowledge. Comparably, in bourdeusian terms in this metamorphic-disciplining process, the audience-subject acquires a '*habitus*' which represents 'a set of disposition which incline agents to act and react in certain ways' (Bourdieu 2005: 12).

#### IV. CONCLUSION: NATO'S SECURITY MYTH AS CULTURAL SYSTEM

In recent years, and as result of its involvement in various theatre of operations NATO has developed a comprehensive approach<sup>v</sup> which in practice imitates the sectorial approach to security developed by Buzan, Waeaver, and de Wilde (1998), according to whom security and insecurity do not have only a military dimension but can be affected by others sectors like the political, economical, societal, and environmental. As result of its paradigm update the Alliance's securitization process takes the above sectors as existential threats.

However, one of the military implication that NATO's has to overcome in this update is to win the battle of narrative (Soligan 2009), meaning that the

Alliance has to concentrate in its spectacle-ritual performance to convince its audience of its utility and indispensability for their security in a new environment in which the NATO's security myth is represented by 'the risk of...'

Therefore, in this new securitization process in which any 'risk of...' insecurity threat is identified, the ritual and spectacles attached to the Alliance's security myth do play the important role to explain what security means. Thus, the approach we have to take, must be dynamic, and we have to 'consume the myth according to the very ends built into its structure: the reader lives the myth as a story at once true and real' (Barthes 2000: 128). Only in this way we can understand that the power-knowledge-security-total institution structure aims to discipline our sensible order practising the 'distribution of the sensible' which, according to Ranciere, is the law governing the sensible order that parcels out places and forms of participation in a common world by first establishing the modes of perception within which these are inscribed. It produces a system of self-evident facts of perception based on a set horizons and modalities of what is visible and audible as well as what can be said, thought, made, or done. The 'distribution' refers both to forms of inclusion and to form of exclusion. The 'sensible' refers to what is *'aistheton'* (sensible) or capable of being apprehended by the senses (Ranciere 2014: 89).

In conclusion, it emerges that the power of the myth is to shape perceptions, cognitions, and preferences of people in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things (Lukes 2005: 11), and to make believe (Walton 1990). And the myth of security (the process of securitization) is converted into (1) a

cultural system, where culture 'denotes an historically transmitted patten of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life' (Geertz 1973: 89), whilst a cultural system is composed of 'culture patterns – religious, philosophical, aesthetic, scientific, ideological – are "programs"; they provide a template or blueprint for the organization of social and psychological processes, much as genetic system provide such a template for the organization of organic processes' (Geertz 1973: 216); (2) a technique of governmentality, defined by Huysmans as technique of governing danger where 'technique refers simultaneously to (i) a particular method of doing an activity which usually involves practical skills that are developed through training and practice, (ii) a mode of procedure in an activity, and (iii) the disposition of things according to a regular plan or design (...). It is embedded in training, routine, and technical knowledge and skills, as well as technological artefacts' (Huysmans 2006: 9); and (3) an ideology the function of which 'is not to offer us a point of escape from our reality but to offer us the social reality itself as an escape from some traumatic, real kernel' (Zizek 2008: 45).

At the end, as Barthes argues, it is the myth (which is produced through the securitization process) which becomes a bourgeois ideology. 'As the bourgeois ideology is defined by the abandonment of the same "bourgeois", myth is constituted by the loss of the historical quality of things: in it, things lose the memory that they once were made' (Barthes 2000: 142). And the myth-bourgeois ideology represented by NATO's security achieves the particular ideology effect of

persuading us that a certain order of the world, a certain way of doing things, is given by nature, rather than the result of human action on the world that could have been otherwise. Thus, paraphrasing Barthes (2000: 143): in passing from history to nature, NATO-security myth acts economically: it abolishes the complexity of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences, it does away with all dialects, with any going back beyond what is immediately visible, it organizes a world which is without contradictions because it is without depth, a world wide open and wallowing in the evident, it establishes a blissful clarity: things appear to mean something by themselves, like the image of the 'Dragoon Ride' operation.

#### ENDNOTES

- [1] Reliable knowledge is knowledge that has a high probability of being true because its veracity has been justified by a reliable method. Reliable knowledge is sometimes called justified true belief, to distinguish reliable knowledge from belief that is false and unjustified or even true but unjustified. Every person has knowledge or beliefs, but not all of each person's knowledge is reliably true and justified. In fact, most individuals believe in things that are untrue or unjustified or both: most people possess a lot of unreliable knowledge and, what's worse, they act on that knowledge! Other ways of knowing, and there are many in addition to science, are not reliable because their discovered knowledge is not justified. Science is a method that allows a person to possess, with the highest degree of certainty possible, reliable knowledge (justified true belief) about nature. The method used to justify scientific knowledge, and thus make it reliable, is called the scientific method.
- [2] For Huysmans 'legitimate security knowledge refers to security knowledge which one can profess as a security expert with a degree of seriousness and without being labelled an idealist or a fool'. Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear,*

*Migration and Asylum in the EU*, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 18.

- [3] Yehuda Elkana in 'A Programmatic Attempt at an Anthropology of Knowledge' (in Mendelsohn, Everett; Elkana, Yehuda, *Sciences and Cultures: anthropological and historical studies of the sciences*, Volume 5, Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company, 1981) defines 'images of knowledge' as socially determined views on knowledge supported and tied to a specific spatial-temporal cultural, political, and power context.
- [4] Available at: <https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-dragon-ride/>
- [5] Available at: <http://www.natolibguides.info/comprehensiveapproach>

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